That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case by Markus, David Oscar & Wessler, Nathan Freed
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
8-1-2016
That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was Wrong
to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to Decide a Cell-
Phone Tracking Case
David Oscar Markus
Nathan Freed Wessler
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Oscar Markus and Nathan Freed Wessler, That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to
Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 1179 (2016)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol70/iss4/7
  
1179
That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was 
Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to 
Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case 
DAVID OSCAR MARKUS AND NATHAN FREED WESSLER 
   In light of society's increasing reliance on technology, this 
article explores a critical question – that of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection over privacy in the digital age. Spe-
cifically, this article addresses how the law currently fails to 
protect the privacy of one’s cell phone records and its ram-
ifications.  By highlighting the antiquated precedent leading 
up to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Davis, 
this article calls on the judiciary to find a more appropriate 
balance for protecting the right to privacy in a modern soci-
ety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) was passed in 
1986, cell phones cost over $3,000 and were the size of a brick.1 
Less than one-half of one percent of the U.S. population owned one.2 
There were only 1,000 cell phone towers in the United States.3 A lot 
has changed since then. Now, almost everyone carries a cell phone, 
which can be tracked by our Government. 
In Quartavius Davis’s case, as in thousands of cases each year, 
the government sought and obtained the cell phone location data of 
a private individual pursuant to a disclosure order under the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) rather than by securing a warrant.4  Un-
der the SCA, a disclosure order does not require a finding of proba-
ble cause.5 Instead, the SCA authorizes the issuance of a disclosure 
order whenever the government “offers specific and articulable facts 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Stephanie Buck, Cell-ebration! 40 Years of Cellphone History, 
MASHABLE (Apr. 3, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/04/03/anniversary-of-cell-
phone/#yNM8b.X2DEqX. 
 2 See Andrea Meyer, 30th Anniversary of the First Commercial Cell Phone 
Call, VERIZON (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.verizonwireless.com/news/arti-
cle/2013/10/30th-anniversary-cell-phone.html. 
 3 See id. 
 4 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Mr. Da-
vis’s first name was misspelled in the case caption. It is Quartavius, not Quartav-
ious. Id. at 500 n.1. 
 5 Id. at 502. 
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showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the rec-
ords sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation.”6 
As a result, the district court never made a probable cause find-
ing before ordering Davis’ service provider to disclose 67 days of 
Davis’ cell phone location records, including more than 11,000 sep-
arate location data points.7 Reversing a unanimous panel opinion, a 
majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held that there is no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in these location records and, even if 
there were such an expectation, a warrantless search would be rea-
sonable nonetheless.8 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Davis was wrong—the 
warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records re-
vealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the 
course of 67 days is not permitted by the Fourth Amendment. 
I. THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. DAVIS 
United States v. Davis presents a critical question: does the 
Fourth Amendment prevent the warrantless acquisition of electronic 
records which reveal the locations and movements of people over 
time?9 
Davis’ petition for certiorari summarized the facts of the case as 
follows: 
In February 2011, in the course of an investigation 
into seven armed robberies that occurred in the 
greater Miami area in 2010, an Assistant United 
States Attorney submitted to a federal magistrate 
judge an application for an order granting access to 
67 days of Quartavius Davis’s historical cell-phone 
location records. The application, which was un-
sworn, did not seek a warrant based on probable 
                                                                                                             
 6 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 7 Davis, 785 F.3d at 502–03, 505–06. 
 8 Id. at 516–18. 
 9 Id. at 500. 
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cause, but rather an order under the Stored Commu-
nications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Such an order 
may issue when the government offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the records sought are rele-
vant and material to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion. 
The application sought to compel a number of cellu-
lar service providers to disclose records related to 
several suspects in the robberies, including Davis. 
Specifically, the application sought stored telephone 
subscriber records, and phone toll records, including 
the corresponding geographic location data (cell 
site). The application recited information regarding 
robberies of retail businesses that occurred on Au-
gust 7, August 31, September 7, September 15, Sep-
tember 25, September 26, and October 1, 2010, in 
and around Miami, Florida, and asserted that the rec-
ords sought were relevant to the investigation of 
those offenses. Rather than restricting the request to 
only the days on which the robberies occurred, how-
ever, the application sought records for the period 
from August 1, 2010 through October 6, 2010, a total 
of 67 days. 
The magistrate judge issued an Order for Stored Cell 
Site Information on February 2, 2011. The order di-
rected MetroPCS, Davis’s cellular service provider, 
to produce all telephone toll records and geographic 
location data (cell site) for Davis’s phone for the pe-
riod of August 1 through October 6, 2010. MetroPCS 
complied, providing 183 pages of Davis’s cell phone 
records to the government. Those records show each 
of Davis’s incoming and outgoing calls during the 
67-day period, along with the cell tower (“cell site”) 
and directional sector of the tower that Davis’s phone 
connected to at the start and end of most of the calls, 
which was typically the nearest and strongest tower. 
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MetroPCS also produced a list of its cell sites in Flor-
ida, providing the longitude, latitude, and physical 
address of each cell site, along with the directional 
orientation of each sector antenna. By cross-refer-
encing the information in Davis’s call detail records 
with MetroPCS’s cell-site list, the government could 
identify the area in which Davis’s phone was located 
and could thereby deduce Davis’s location and 
movements at multiple points each day.10 
The size of the cell site sectors in a particular area is a substantial 
determinant in the precision of a cell phone user’s location as re-
ported in cell site location information (“CSLI”) records.11  While 
the existence of towers with six sectors is becoming more prevalent, 
most cell sites contain three directional antennas, dividing the cell 
site into three sectors.12  In geographic areas in which there is a 
greater density of cell towers, the coverage area of each cell site sec-
tor is smaller.  As a result, urban areas that have the greatest density 
have the smallest coverage areas.13 
As data usage grows with the increasing adoption of 
smartphones, cell site density continues to increase.14  Carriers must 
erect additional cell sites to accommodate increased usage for text 
messages, emails, web browsing, streaming video, etc., as each cell 
site accommodates a fixed volume of data.15  As a result, in dense 
                                                                                                             
 10 Petition for Certiorari, Davis v. United States, 2015 WL 4607865, at *4-*6 
(“Davis Petition”). The authors of this article were counsel for Mr. Davis on his 
petition for certiorari. This article expands on their work in the petition. 
 11 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928 (11th Cir. Jun 
01, 2012). 
 12 Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 13 Id. at 503. For example, in 2010, MetroPCS, the carrier used by Davis, 
operated a total of 214 cell sites comprising 714 sector antennas within Miami-
Dade County. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 21, at 14. 
 14 See Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA (June 2015), 
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-in-
dustry-survey. 
 15 See id. (showing that the number of cell sites in the United States nearly 
doubled from 2003 to 2013). Id. (wireless data usage increased by 9,228% be-
tween 2009 and 2013). 
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urban and suburban areas such as Miami, there are numerous sectors 
that cover small geographic areas, which as a result offer fairly pre-
cise information about a phone’s location.16 
In this particular case, the information provided by MetroPCS 
consisted solely of information identifying Davis’s cell site and sec-
tor at the beginning and end of his calls. But carriers are developing 
the capability to store ever more precise location data. 17 As carriers 
implement millions of “small cells,” which provide service to areas 
as small as ten meters, location precision is further increasing.18  
These “small cells” permit callers to be located with a “‘high degree 
of precision, sometimes effectively identifying individual floors and 
rooms within buildings.’”19 
In this case, the government obtained call detail records from 
Davis’ phone that contained a wealth of location data.  The “CSLI” 
provided by these records pertained to 5,803 phone calls, and re-
vealed 11,606 individual location data points (because cell site lo-
cation information was recorded at the start and end of each of the 
calls).20 “This averages around one location data point every five 
and one half minutes for those sixty-seven days, assuming Mr. Davis 
slept eight hours a night.”21  Much sensitive and private information 
about Davis was revealed through this information about his loca-
tions, movements, and associations: 
The amount and type of data at issue revealed so 
much information about Mr. Davis’s day-to-day life 
that most of us would consider quintessentially pri-
vate. For instance, on August 13, 2010, Mr. Davis 
made or received 108 calls in 22 unique cell site sec-
tors, showing his movements throughout Miami dur-
ing that day. And the record reflects that many phone 
calls began within one cell site sector and ended in 
                                                                                                             
 16 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 503. 
 17 See, e.g., Verizon Wireless, Law Enforcement Resource Team (LERT) 
Guide, PUB. INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 20, 2009), http://publicintelligence.net/verizon-
wireless-law-enforcement-resource-team-lert-guide/ (providing sample records 
indicating caller’s distance from cell site to within .1 of a mile). 
 18 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 11, at 10–11. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Davis, 785 F.3d at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 21 Id. at 540 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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another, exposing his movements even during the 
course of a single phone call. 
Also, by focusing on the first and last calls in a day, 
law enforcement could determine from the location 
data where Mr. Davis lived, where he slept, and 
whether those two locations were the same. As a gov-
ernment witness testified at trial, “if you look at the 
majority of . . . calls over a period of time when 
somebody wakes up and when somebody goes to 
sleep, normally it is fairly simple to decipher where 
their home tower would be.” Trial Tr. 42, Feb. 7, 
2012, ECF No. 285. For example, from August 2, 
2010, to August 31, 2010, Mr. Davis’s first and last 
call of the day were either or both placed from a sin-
gle sector—purportedly his home sector. But on the 
night of September 2, 2010, Mr. Davis made calls at 
11:41pm, 6:52am, and 10:56am—all from a location 
that was not his home sector. Just as Justice So-
tomayor warned [in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012)], Mr. Davis’s “movements [were] rec-
orded and aggregated in a manner that enable[d] the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, . . . 
[his] sexual habits, and so on.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 
956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).22 
As a result of this substantial invasion of Davis’s privacy, he 
moved before trial to suppress these CSLI records, arguing that the 
government needed a warrant to obtain the records under the Fourth 
Amendment.23  The district court summarily denied David’s motion 
at the conclusion of the suppression hearing.  The court indicated 
that it would subsequently issue a written opinion.24  During trial, 
Davis renewed the suppression motion, but it again was summarily 
                                                                                                             
 22 Id. at 540–41 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 23 Id. at 503. 
 24 United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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denied by the court with the promise of a subsequent written opin-
ion.25  The court never issued any written opinion explaining its de-
nial of the motion.26 
The case proceeded to trial: 
At trial, the government introduced the entirety of 
Davis’s CSLI records as evidence, and relied on 
them to establish Davis’s location on the days of the 
charged robberies. A detective with the Miami-Dade 
Police Department testified that Davis’s CSLI rec-
ords placed him near the sites of six of the robberies.  
The detective also produced maps showing the loca-
tion of Davis’s phone relative to the locations of the 
robberies, which the government introduced into ev-
idence.  Thus, the government relied upon the infor-
mation it got from MetroPCS to specifically pin Mr. 
Davis’s location at a particular site in Miami. The 
prosecutor asserted to the trial judge, for example, 
that Mr. Davis’s phone was literally right up against 
the America Gas Station immediately preceding and 
after the robbery occurred, and argued to the jury in 
closing that the records put Davis literally right on 
top of the Advance Auto Parts one minute before that 
robbery took place. 
The jury convicted Davis of two counts of conspir-
acy to interfere with interstate commerce by threats 
or violence in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a); seven Hobbs Act robbery offenses; and 
seven counts of using, carrying, or possessing a fire-
arm in each robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c). All but the first of the § 924(c) convictions 
carried mandatory consecutive minimum sentences 
of 25 years each. As a result, the court sentenced Da-
vis to nearly 162 years’ imprisonment. The court 
stated at sentencing that in light of Davis’s young age 
(18 and 19 years old at the time of the offenses) and 
                                                                                                             
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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the nature of the crimes, the court believed a sentence 
of 40 years would have been appropriate. Because 
the court was afforded no discretion in sentencing, 
however, it sentenced Davis to 162 years in prison.27 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, a unanimous three-judge 
panel held that the government violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment 
rights by requesting and obtaining his historical cell site location in-
formation without a warrant.28  Judge Sentelle,29 the opinion’s au-
thor, stated that Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
CSLI because this data revealed information about his whereabouts 
in private locations, thereby “convert[ing] what would otherwise be 
a private event into a public one.”30  As the opinion explained, 
“[t]here is a reasonable privacy interest in being near the home of a 
lover, or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship, or a 
house of ill repute.”31  It further held that the cellular carrier’s pos-
session of Davis’s CSLI did not deprive Davis of a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in that information because his location was not 
voluntarily provided to MetroPCS.32 The Eleventh Circuit nonethe-
less affirmed the district court’s denial of Davis’s suppression mo-
tion on the basis that the government relied in good faith on the mag-
istrate judge’s order issued under the Stored Communications Act.  
It found that the exclusionary rule therefore did not apply.33 
On en banc rehearing, a divided Eleventh Circuit vacated the 
panel opinion.34 In the majority opinion, Judge Hull held that Davis 
                                                                                                             
 27 Davis Petition at *10-*11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 
 28 Id. at 1217. 
 29 Judge Sentelle sat on the panel by designation from the D.C. Circuit. 
Judges Martin and Dubina joined Judge Sentelle’s opinion. 
 30 Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 1217. 
 33 Id. at 1217–18. 
 34 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12 n.10, Quartavious Davis v. United 
States of America, 785 F.3d at 541 (No. 15-146) (“Only one member of the orig-
inal panel participated in en banc reconsideration. Judge Sentelle was not permit-
ted to participate because he had participated in the panel as a visitor from the 
D.C. Circuit. Judge Dubina has taken senior status, and opted not to participate in 
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had no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone location rec-
ords held by MetroPCS, and therefore no Fourth Amendment search 
occurred.35 Judge Hull concluded that use of an SCA order rather 
than a warrant is reasonable, even if there was a Fourth Amendment 
search, because of the government’s compelling interest in investi-
gating crimes and because the privacy intrusion was minor.36 
Five of the en banc court’s eleven judges diverged from this rea-
soning. Judge Jordan, joined by Judge Wilson, wrote separately to 
express the concern that 
[a]s technology advances, location information from 
cellphones (and, of course, smartphones) will un-
doubtedly become more precise and easier to obtain, 
and if there is no expectation of privacy here, I have 
some concerns about the government being able to 
conduct 24/7 electronic tracking (live or historical) 
in the years to come without an appropriate judicial 
order.37 
Although Judge Jordan did not join the court’s conclusion that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI records, he 
concurred that (if conducted with an SCA order) a search of CSLI 
is reasonable.38 
Judge Rosenbaum also wrote separately, offering a note of cau-
tion: 
In our time, unless a person is willing to live “off the 
grid,” it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the 
most personal of information to third-party service 
providers on a constant basis, just to navigate daily 
life. And the thought that the government should be 
able to access such information without the basic 
                                                                                                             
en banc reconsideration. See 11th Cir. R. 35-10.”). See also United States v. Da-
vis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 35 Davis, 785 F.3d at 515–16. 
 36 Id. at 517–18. The court held in the alternative that the good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule applies. Id. at 518 n.20. 
 37 Id. at 521 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 38 Id. at 522–23 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
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protection that a warrant offers is nothing less than 
chilling.39 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Martin, joined by Judge Jill Pryor, 
contended that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI, 
and that the government should be required to obtain a warrant be-
fore accessing this information.40 
II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION WAS WRONG. 
In two recent landmark cases, the Supreme Court has addressed 
critical questions regarding how the Fourth Amendment should be 
applied in the digital age.41  These cases, however, leave open the 
critical question of whether historical cell phone location records 
held by a service provider are protected by the warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
As Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones 
discussed, location records reveal extraordinarily sensitive details of 
a person’s life, “reflect[ing] a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”42 Yet the 
Eleventh Circuit analogized to the rather limited analog data that had 
been addressed in the Supreme Court’s third-party records decisions 
from the 1970s, and held that voluminous, digitized historical loca-
tion records are unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.43  This was, 
perhaps, unwise, as the Supreme Court recently cautioned that “any 
extension of . . . reasoning [from decisions concerning analog 
searches] to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.”44 The Elev-
enth Circuit nonetheless relied blindly on “pre-digital analogue[s]” 
risks causing “a significant diminution of privacy.”45 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. at 525 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). 
 40 Id. at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 41 See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (warrant required 
for search of cell phone seized incident to lawful arrest); see also United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (tracking car with GPS device is a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 42 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 43 Davis, 785 F.3d at 507–08 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 
and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). 
 44 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 45 Id. at 2493. 
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In seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court, Davis summa-
rized the Court’s precedent as follows: 
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the pervasive location monitoring made pos-
sible by GPS tracking technology surreptitiously and 
warrantlessly attached to a vehicle.46 All members of 
the Court agreed that attaching a GPS device to a ve-
hicle and tracking its movements constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.47 In so holding, the 
Court made clear that the government’s use of novel 
digital surveillance technologies not in existence at 
the framing of the Fourth Amendment does not es-
cape the Fourth Amendment’s reach.48 
In Riley v. California, the Court addressed Ameri-
cans’ privacy rights in the contents of their cell 
phones, unanimously holding that warrantless search 
of the contents of a cell phone incident to a lawful 
arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.49 In so doing, 
the Court rejected the government’s inapt analogy to 
other physical objects that have historically been 
subject to warrantless search incident to an arrest.50 
[Davis and similar cases] raise a hotly contested 
question that sits at the confluence of Jones and Ri-
ley: whether the pervasive location data generated by 
                                                                                                             
 46 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 47 See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
 48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
34 (2001)) (“we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against gov-
ernment that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”); See also id. 
at 964 (“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others 
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and cat-
alogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period”) 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 49 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 50 Id. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative 
sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”). 
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use of a cell phone is protected from warrantless 
search by the Fourth Amendment.51 
Definitive resolution of this question, on which courts around 
the country have disagreed, is necessary to provide guidance to law 
enforcement and the public about the extent of Fourth Amendment 
rights in the digital age. 
Ready access to a complete map of a person’s movements raises 
questions that have been long recognized as of particularly signifi-
cance.52 As Judge Kozinski has observed, 
[w]hen requests for cell phone location information 
have become so numerous that the telephone com-
pany must develop a self-service website so that law 
enforcement agents can retrieve user data from the 
comfort of their desks, we can safely say that ‘such 
dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ are already 
in use.53 
The protection of a warrant is needed to ensure that the Fourth 
Amendment is not eviscerated as law enforcement accelerates its 
warrantless access to huge stores of sensitive personal location data. 
The use of cell phones is now prevalent, with “more than 90% 
of American adults . . . own[ing] a cell phone,”54 more than 335 mil-
lion wireless subscriber accounts in the United States,55 and 47 per-
cent of households utilizing only cell phones.56  As Justice Alito rec-
ognized in Jones, cell phones are “[p]erhaps most significant” of the 
                                                                                                             
 51 Davis Petition at *15-* 16 
 52 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The Supreme Court 
in [United States v.] Knotts [460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983)] expressly left open 
whether ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country’ by means 
of ‘dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ violates the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantee of personal privacy.”). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 2490. 
 55 Annual Wireless Industry Survey, supra note 14. 
 56 Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Re-
lease of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–June 
2014, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 2014), 
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“many new devices that permit the monitoring of a person’s move-
ments.”57 Given the near-universal adoption of cellular technology, 
it is no surprise that law enforcement has a growing appetite for cell 
phone-related data. 
Indeed, the government now requests a staggering quantity of 
CSLI from service providers. In 2015, for example, AT&T received 
76,340 requests for cell phone location data information.58 Of those, 
58,189 were for historical CSLI.59 Verizon received approximately 
20,298 requests for cell phone location data in just the second half 
of 2015.60 
In the case under discussion, the government seized Davis’s lo-
cation data covering 67 days and 11,606 location data points.61 This 
is in line with the average law enforcement request reported by one 
major service provider, which “asks for approximately fifty-five 
days of records.”62 Other recent cases involve even greater quanti-
ties of sensitive location information that was obtained without a 
warrant.  For example, in one case, the government was able to ob-
tain 29,659 location points for one defendant from 221 days (over 
seven months) of cell site location information.63 In another, the 
government obtained 12,898 cell site location data points from 127 
days of tracking.64 
                                                                                                             
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201412.pdf. See also 
Annual Wireless Industry Survey, supra note 14. 
 57 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 58 Transparency Report, AT&T 4 (2016), http://about.att.com/con-
tent/dam/csr/Transparency%20Re-
ports/ATT_Transparency%20Report_Jan%202016.pdf. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Verizon’s Transparency Report for the 2nd Half of 2015, VERIZON 5 
(2016), http://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/us-report/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
 61 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Mar-
tin, J., dissenting). 
 62 Transparency Report for 2013 & 2014, T-MOBILE 5 (2015), http://news-
room.t-mobile.com/content/1020/files/ NewTransparencyReport.pdf. 
 63 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 350 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 64 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. Carpenter, 2015 WL 1138148, No. 
14-1572 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2015). 
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Despite the breadth of these requests, law enforcement agencies 
frequently obtain the CSLI data without a probable cause warrant.  
One survey of public records request responses from roughly 250 
local law enforcement agencies showed that “only a tiny minority 
reported consistently obtaining a warrant and demonstrating proba-
ble cause” for CSLI.65 Given the ubiquity of cell phone usage, and 
the heavy reliance on CSLI requests, it is important that courts settle 
the question in a way that appropriately protects Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
Davis and similar cases are not only about the Fourth Amend-
ment status of CSLI, but also address how the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment apply to other sensitive and private data in the 
hands of trusted third-parties. 
As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones, 
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about them-
selves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.66 
Applying the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in Da-
vis would not have required a wholesale reassessment of the third-
party doctrine. But the courts must clarify how analog-age prece-
dents in this area can be applied to digital surveillance techniques. 
In the Davis panel decision, the court found that the third-party 
doctrine does not apply to CSLI because the data was not voluntarily 
conveyed to carriers, and because of the sensitivity of the data.67 In 
the en banc dissent, Judge Martin agreed, expressing alarm that “the 
                                                                                                             
 65 Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, ACLU (Mar. 25, 
2013), https://www.aclu.org/cases/cell-phone-location-tracking-public-records-
request. 
 66 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 67 United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (stating that “there is reason-
able privacy interest in being near the home of a lover, or a dispensary of medi-
cation, or a place of worship . . . we do not see the factual distinction as taking 
Davis’s location outside his expectation of privacy.”). 
1194 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
majority’s blunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to 
allow the government access to a staggering amount of information 
that surely must be protected under the Fourth Amendment.”68 Yet 
the en banc majority resolved the case with a straight application of 
Smith, ignoring the significant changes over the intervening 35 years 
in technology and expectations of privacy.69 Three concurring 
judges wrote separately to register their concerns about exempting 
the CSLI records at issue from Fourth Amendment protections, in-
viting the Court to clarify the scope of the rule announced in Miller 
and Smith.70 Other courts are similarly divided.71 
This struggle in applying pre-digital precedents from United 
States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland is seen throughout the lower 
courts.72 The principle taken from these cases, known as the “third-
party doctrine,” provides that certain records or information shared 
with third parties do not deserve Fourth Amendment protection.73 
Smith involved short-term use of a pen register to capture the tele-
phone numbers that a person dials, finding this not to be a Fourth 
Amendment search.74 The decision was based in large part on the 
fact that by dialing a number, the caller “voluntarily convey[s] nu-
merical information to the telephone company.”75 In addition, the 
Smith court evaluated the degree of invasiveness of the surveillance 
                                                                                                             
 68 Davis, 785 F.3d at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 508. 
 70 Id. at 521 (Jordan, J., concurring); Id. at 524–25 (Rosenbaum, J., concur-
ring). 
 71 Compare In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612–13 (5th Cir. 2013) (no expectation of privacy in CSLI 
under Smith) and United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(same), with In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Pro-
vider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 
317 (3d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Smith and holding that cell phone users may 
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI), and Graham, 824 F.3d at 444 
(Wynn, J., dissenting) (“CSLI is not ‘voluntarily conveyed’ by a cell phone user, 
and therefore is not subject to the third-party doctrine.”). 
 72 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) and Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 73 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (noting the application of the 
third-party doctrine and that “cell phone users voluntarily convey cell tower loca-
tion information to telephone companies in the course of making and receiving 
calls on their cell phones.”). 
 74 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
 75 Id. at 744. 
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in order to determine whether the user had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.76 For example, the Court noted the “pen register’s lim-
ited capabilities,”77 explaining that “‘a law enforcement official 
could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a 
communication existed.’”78 Miller, a case involving bank depositor 
transaction records voluntarily provided to the bank, resolved simi-
larly.79 
The struggle in defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections for newer forms of sensitive digital data are reflected in 
widespread scholarly criticism of the expansive application of the 
third-party doctrine beyond the kinds of records at issue in Smith 
and Miller.80 Scholars and judges have asked the Supreme Court to 
ensure that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence keeps pace with tech-
nology’s rapid advance. 
The Davis case offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to ad-
dress the application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
to sensitive and private records held by a third party. Deprived of 
this guidance, a cell phone user “cannot  know  the  scope  of  his 
constitutional  protection,  nor  can  a  policeman  know the scope 
of his authority.”81 It is becoming increasingly urgent that the Court 
provide a clear constitution rule governing location data and other 
sensitive digital records. 
A.   The Federal Courts of Appeals and State High Courts Are 
Divided. 
The Davis en banc opinion further broadens the conflict over 
whether and when sensitive cell phone location data held by a ser-
vice provider is protected by a warrant requirement. 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 741–42. 
 77 Id. at 742. 
 78 Id. at 741. 
 79 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–42 (finding “no intrusion into any area in which 
respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment interest”). 
 80 See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in 
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 
122 (2002); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 
1151–52 (2002). 
 81 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981). 
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1. IN FLORIDA, STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS ARE SPLIT OVER 
THE EXISTENCE OF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
CSLI. 
Florida law enforcement agents are now faced with a difficult 
decision.  They now must choose whether to follow the holding of 
the state supreme court in Tracey v. State, and obtain a warrant be-
fore seizing CSLI, or whether to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s hold-
ing in Davis and proceed without a warrant. In Tracey, the Supreme 
Court of Florida held that there is a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment in real-time cell phone location 
data, and that accordingly a warrant is required.82 Historical CSLI 
records were not at issue in Tracey,83 but the court found that the 
same principles that courts have held to create a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in historical CSLI also require protection of real–
time CSLI.84  Indeed, there is little meaningful difference between 
historical and real-time records.  Both offer information about a per-
son’s private location, and both permit law enforcement to discover 
a large quantity of private information about a person’s movements.  
The historical records, if anything, are more intrusive because they 
provide a window back in time. 
Likewise, a number of states require a warrant for historical 
CSLI by statute or under their state constitution as interpreted by the 
state’s highest court.85 Additional states require a warrant for real-
time cell phone location data.86 Requiring a warrant for CSLI as a 
matter of federal constitutional law would harmonize the protections 
available in state and federal investigations in these states as well. 
Even if state and local law enforcement agencies elect to follow 
Tracey, residents of Florida are nonetheless subject to varying 
                                                                                                             
 82 Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014). 
 83 Id. at 516. 
 84 Id. at 523. 
 85 See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 866 (Mass. 2014); CAL. 
PENAL CODE §1546.1(b)(1) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-303.5(2) (2014); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 648 (2014); MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.28(3)(d), 626A.42(2) 
(2014); MONT. CODE § 46-5-110(1)(a) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. § 644-A:2 
(2015); UTAH CODE § 77-23c-102(1)(a) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 8102(b)(1). 
 86 See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 168/10 (2014); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-12 (2014); MD. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
§ 1-203.1(b) (2015); VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(C) (2015). 
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Fourth Amendment protections depending on whether they are in-
vestigated by state or federal agents. This variation, based on the 
luck of the draw as to which agency investigates, is unacceptable. 
2. THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THE THIRD-
PARTY DOCTRINE CIRCUMVENTS THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
OF PRIVACY IN A PERSON’S HISTORICAL CSLI. 
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit now holds that there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location 
information under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that no 
warrant is required.87 In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell 
Site Data, involved a magistrate judge who rejected a government 
application for an order seeking historical CSLI, pursuant to the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).88 The judge held 
that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant.89 On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that cell users maintain an ex-
pectation of privacy in the data because they do not voluntarily con-
vey to the service provider their location information.90  The Fifth 
Circuit found that the cell service provider’s creation and possession 
of the records eliminates any expectation of privacy in CSLI.91 More 
recently, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit and a divided en banc 
Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion.92 
                                                                                                             
 87 In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 613–14; see also United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358–59 
(5th Cir. 2014) (applying Historical Site in the context of a suppression motion). 
The Sixth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to shorter-
term real-time tracking of a cell phone user’s location during a single three-day 
multi-state trip on public highways. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–
781 (6th Cir. 2012). The court reserved decision about “situations where police, 
using otherwise legal methods, so comprehensively track a person’s activities that 
the very comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.” Id. at 780 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957–64 
(2012)). 
 91 Id. at 613. 
 92 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F. 3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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Other courts disagree.  The Third Circuit has held that magistrate 
judges have discretion to require a warrant for historical CSLI, in 
those circumstances in which the location information implicates an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights by, for example, re-
vealing when a person is inside a constitutionally protected space.93 
The Third Circuit rejected the argument that a cell phone user’s ex-
pectation of privacy is eviscerated by the carrier’s ability to access 
that information: 
A cell phone customer has not “voluntarily” shared 
his location information with a cellular provider in 
any meaningful way. [ . . . ] [I]t is unlikely that cell 
phone customers are aware that their cell phone pro-
viders collect and store historical location infor-
mation. Therefore, “[w]hen a cell phone user makes 
a call, the only information that is voluntarily and 
knowingly conveyed to the phone company is the 
number that is dialed and there is no indication to the 
user that making that call will also locate the caller; 
when a cell phone user receives a call, he hasn’t vol-
untarily exposed anything at all.”94 
For this reason, the court found that the third-party doctrine does 
not apply to historical CSLI records.95 A divided panel of the Fourth 
Circuit agreed with this view, “declin[ing] to apply the third-party 
doctrine in the present case because a cell phone user does not ‘con-
vey’ CSLI to her service provider at all—voluntarily or otherwise—
and therefore does not assume any risk of disclosure to law enforce-
ment.”96 En banc reconsideration of the panel opinion is pending. 
                                                                                                             
 93 In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3rd 
Cir. 2010). 
 94 Id. at 317–18. 
 95 Id. 
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3. THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THERE IS A 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN LONGER-TERM 
LOCATION INFORMATION COLLECTED ELECTRONICALLY. 
Circuits also are split over the question of expectation of privacy 
in longer-term electronic data.  The D.C. Circuit held in United 
States v. Maynard that surreptitiously tracking a car over 28 days 
using a GPS device violates reasonable expectations of privacy and 
therefore constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.97 The court ex-
plained that 
“[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of infor-
mation not revealed by short-term surveillance, such 
as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not 
do, and what he does ensemble. These types of infor-
mation can each reveal more about a person than 
does any individual trip viewed in isolation.”98 
The court recognized that people have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the private information revealed by “prolonged GPS 
monitoring.”99 
This holding remains controlling law in the D.C. Circuit (though 
the Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, relying on a trespass-
based rationale.).100 The holding is not dependent on the particular 
type of tracking technology at issue, as extended electronic surveil-
lance of the location of a person’s cell phone is at least as invasive 
as prolonged electronic surveillance of the location of a person’s ve-
hicle.101 
                                                                                                             
 97 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on 
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 98 Id. at 562. 
 99 Id. at 563. 
 100 See Will Baude, Further Thoughts on the Precedential Status of Decisions 
Affirmed on Alternate Grounds, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 3, 2013, 7:27 
PM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/03/thoughts-precedential-status-decisions-af-
firmed-alternate-grounds/. 
 101 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that law enforcement access to cell phone location information is “[p]er-
haps most significant” of the “many new devices that permit the monitoring of a 
person’s movements.”). 
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In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit went a different way, rejecting 
this reasoning and opining that “reasonable expectations of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment do not turn on the quantity of non-
content information MetroPCS collected in its historical cell tower 
location records.”102 The decision widened the circuit split over 
whether people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
longer-term location information103 
4.  THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLIES WHEN THERE IS A 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN CSLI OR OTHER 
ELECTRONICALLY COLLECTED LOCATION INFORMATION. 
A circuit split also exists over whether a warrant is required 
when there is, in fact, a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI 
data.  The en banc majority in Davis held that the government’s war-
rantless seizure and search of the records was reasonable, even if 
Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI.104 This 
alternative holding cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding proscription that warrantless searches are “‘per se un-
reasonable.’”105 
                                                                                                             
 102 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 515 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 103 Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(prolonged electronic location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment), 
with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the “police did not conduct an impermissible search of Pineda-
Moreno’s car by monitoring its location with mobile tracking devices”), United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–99 (7th Cir. 2007) (prolonged electronic lo-
cation tracking is not a search under the Fourth Amendment), and United States 
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A person traveling via automo-
bile on public streets has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one locale to another.”). 
 104 Davis, 785 F.3d at 515. 
 105 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). See Orin Kerr, Eleventh Circuit Rules for the 
Feds on Cell-Site Records – But Then Overreaches, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/05/elev-
enth-circuit-rules-for-the-feds-on-cell-site-records-but-then-overreaches/ (“[T]he 
en banc court’s alternative holding . . . [is] a novel development of the law that 
cuts against a lot of practice and precedent.”). 
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Certain searches conducted outside the scope of traditional law 
enforcement, or aimed at categories of people in specific circum-
stances where the expectation of privacy is reduced, may not require 
probable cause warrants.106 In the CSLI cases, neither of these ex-
ceptions apply; no “special need” beyond regular normal law en-
forcement operation is served by the data requests. Indeed, even the 
en banc Eleventh Circuit recognized that the government’s search 
of Davis’s CSLI was in furtherance of “[t]he societal interest in 
promptly apprehending criminals and preventing them from com-
mitting future offenses.”107 Neither Davis nor any other similarly 
situated criminal suspect have a reduced expectation of privacy jus-
tifying rejection of the warrant requirement.108 
The Eleventh Circuit’s alternate holding not only conflicts with 
prior decisions of the Supreme Court, but also creates a split with 
the courts that have required a warrant for law enforcement access 
to CSLI and that have found there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI or other electronically collected location infor-
mation.109 
B.   The En Banc Eleventh Circuit Erred In Holding That 
Accessing Historical Cell Site Location Records From A Service 
Prodicer Was Not A Search  
The Eleventh Circuit majority found Davis’ position to be un-
sustainable merely because the government obtained the CSLI rec-
ords from Davis’s cell carrier rather than directly from Davis, in 
light of United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.110 This is a 
                                                                                                             
 106 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 107 Davis, 785 F.3d at 518. 
 108 Cf. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (parolees); Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (student athletes). 
 109 See Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (probable cause war-
rant required for tracking CSLI); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 866 
(Mass. 2014) (same, under state constitution); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 
(N.J. 2013) (same); see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566–67 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that warrant is required for prolonged GPS tracking of 
a car and rejecting application of the automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009) (warrant required 
for GPS tracking under state constitution). 
 110 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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misreading of applicable law. The Supreme Court should clarify that 
a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his location data is not 
eliminated, in and of itself, by a service provider’s access to that 
data.  While a third-party’s access to records may be a factor rele-
vant to the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis, the 
third-party doctrine set forth in Miller and Smith does not make the 
fact of such access the sine qua non of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. As the Court has repeatedly explained, limited third-party ac-
cess to information or locations does not destroy otherwise-reason-
able expectations of privacy.111 
Instead, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test relies on a to-
tality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  The mechanical application of 
holdings from the analog age is improper in this new era involving 
highly sensitive and voluminous digitized records.112 “[I]t is virtu-
ally impossible to participate fully in modern life without leaving a 
trail of digital breadcrumbs that create a pervasive record of the most 
sensitive aspects of our lives. Ensuring that technological advances 
                                                                                                             
 111 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418–19 (2013) (Kagan, J., con-
curring) (expectation of privacy in odors detectable by a police dog that emanate 
from a home); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (information about location and movement in public, 
even though exposed to public view); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 
(2001) (thermal signatures emanating from a home); Ferguson v. City of Charles-
ton, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by 
the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of 
those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”); 
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000) (bag exposed to the public on 
luggage rack of bus); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990) (“an over-
night guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home” even 
though his possessions may be disturbed by “his host and those his host allows 
inside”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1984) (reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in letters and sealed packages entrusted to private freight car-
rier); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) (reasonable expectation 
of privacy in contents of phone call even though call is conducted over private 
companies’ networks); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487–90 (1964) (im-
plicit consent to janitorial personnel to enter motel room does not amount to con-
sent for police to search room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17 
(1961) (search of a house invaded tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights even though 
landlord had authority to enter house for some purposes). 
 112 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). 
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do not erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,113 
requires nuanced applications of analog-age precedents.”114 
The conclusion that Davis retained a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his CSLI does not require rejection of Smith and Miller, 
but rather can be squared with those cases’ plain terms. The Su-
preme Court has looked to factors such as whether the records were 
“voluntarily conveyed,”115 and what privacy interest a person has in 
the information,116 when evaluating an individual’s expectation of 
privacy in records held by a third party. As opposed to the dialed 
phone numbers and limited bank records at issue in Smith and Mil-
ler, “[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his loca-
tion information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”117 
The location information that is tracked is not voluntarily entered by 
the user into the phone, nor otherwise in any way affirmatively 
transmitted to the carrier. This is even more the case when a person 
receives a call, thereby taking no action that would knowingly or 
voluntarily reveal location. 
In addition the location records contained in CSLI are exceed-
ingly sensitive and private. First, because people carry their phones 
virtually everywhere they go, including inside their homes and other 
constitutionally protected spaces, cell phone location records can re-
veal information about presence, location, and activity in those 
spaces. 
In United States v. Karo, the [Supreme Court] held 
that location tracking implicates Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests when it may reveal information 
about individuals in areas where they have reasona-
ble expectations of privacy.118 The Court explained 
that using an electronic device—there, a beeper—to 
                                                                                                             
 113 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 114 Davis Petition at *30-*31 (internal quotation omitted). 
 115 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 116 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–42. 
 117 In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3rd 
Cir. 2010). 
 118 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984). 
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infer facts about ‘location[s] not open to visual sur-
veillance,’ like whether ‘a particular article is actu-
ally located at a particular time in the private resi-
dence,’ or to later confirm that the article remains on 
the premises, was just as unreasonable as physically 
searching the location without a warrant.119 Such lo-
cation tracking ‘falls within the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment when it reveals information that could 
not have been obtained through visual surveillance’ 
from a public place,120 regardless of whether it re-
veals that information directly or through infer-
ence.121 
Second, CSLI data reveals a large amount of sensitive and pri-
vate information about a person’s movements and activities in pub-
lic and private spaces that, at least long-term, violates reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The majority opinion in Jones relied on a 
trespass-based rationale to find a search,122 making clear that “[s]it-
uations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals with-
out trespass would remain subject to Katz [reasonable expectation 
of privacy] analysis.”123 Five Justices conducted a Katz analysis, 
finding that (at least) longer-term location tracking violates reason-
able expectations of privacy.124 
This conclusion is not particularized to the type of tracking tech-
nology at issue in Jones.  As Justice Alito identified, mobile devices 
are “[p]erhaps most significant” of the emerging technologies capa-
ble of location tracking.125 The Supreme Court recently emphasized 
this point, explaining that cell phone location data is particularly 
sensitive because it “can reconstruct someone’s specific movements 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 707 
 121 See Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (use of thermal imaging 
device to learn information about interior of home constitutes a search). Davis 
Petition at *32. 
 122 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 123 Id. at 953. 
 124 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 125 Id. at 963. 
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down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particu-
lar building.”126 
In Davis, the records obtained by the government implicated 
both the expectation of privacy in longer-term location information 
and in private spaces.127 These records told the government when 
Davis slept at home and when he slept elsewhere.128 They showed, 
nearly to the minute, his movements around his community.129 They 
even allowed the government to learn with whom he associated and 
when he did so.130 
Recent data shows that more than 80 percent of people consider 
“[d]etails of [their] physical location over time” to be “sensitive”—
evincing greater concern for this data than for the contents of their 
text messages, a list of numbers they have called or websites they 
have visited, or their relationship history.131 Historical CSLI enables 
the government to “monitor and track our cell phones, and thus our-
selves, with minimal expenditure of funds and manpower, [which] 
is just the type of gradual and silent encroachment into the very de-
tails of our lives that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent.”132 
III. WHERE DAVIS LEADS 
Davis and other cases concerning the Fourth Amendment’s ap-
plication to historical CSLI raise fundamental questions about how 
to apply the protections of the Bill of Rights, now more than 220 
years old, to the digital age. As law enforcement agencies increas-
ingly rely on access to sensitive troves of digital data held by third-
party companies and deploy ever-more-sophisticated surveillance 
                                                                                                             
 126 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
at 955 (Sotomayer, J., concurring)). 
 127 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 539–41 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) 
(Martin, J., Dissenting). 
 128 Davis, 785 F.3d at 540 (Martin, J., Dissenting). 
 129 Id. 
 130 See Trial Transcript at 12–14, United States v. Davis, No. 10-20896-CR-
GOLD (Feb. 6, 2012), ECF No. 283. 
 131 Public Perceptions of Privacy and Secuirty in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER 34 (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/2014/11/12/public-prviacy-perceptions/. 
 132 Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 522 (Fla. 2014). 
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technologies, courts are struggling to keep up. The historical CSLI 
cases preview a broader, percolating debate over how to apply the 
third-party doctrine in the digital age and how to appropriately con-
strain the pervasive collection of location information using surrep-
titious surveillance devices.133 
Cell site location information is far from the only sensitive in-
formation held in digital storage by third parties for which Fourth 
Amendment protections are needed.134 Indeed, as the dissenting 
judges in Davis wrote, 
the majority’s blunt application of the third-party 
doctrine threatens to allow the government access to 
a staggering amount of information that surely must 
be protected under the Fourth Amendment. Consider 
the information that Google gets from users of its e-
mail and online search functions. According to its 
website, Google collects information about you 
(name, e-mail address, telephone number, and credit 
card data); the things you do online (what videos you 
watch, what websites you access, and how you view 
and interact with advertisements); the devices you 
use (which particular phone or computer you are 
searching on); and your actual location . . . .Under a 
plain reading of the majority’s rule, by allowing a 
third-party company access to our e-mail accounts, 
the websites we visit, and our search-engine his-
tory—all for legitimate business purposes—we give 
up any privacy interest in that information.135 
Although, ultimately, it may fall to the Supreme Court to explain 
how to reconcile the analog-age third-party doctrine to digital-age 
realities, state and federal courts cannot escape grappling with 
Fourth Amendment protection for sensitive information held by a 
third party.136 
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In some areas, federal and state courts have extended the warrant 
requirement to digital data held by a third party.137 Courts have held, 
for example, that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of email stored on service providers’ servers, analogiz-
ing those records to the contents of letters entrusted to the postal 
service.138 Recognizing that warrantless access to a phone com-
pany’s records of the phone numbers a person dials is permitted by 
Smith v. Maryland, courts have distinguished so-called “post-cut-
through dialed digits,” which are “any numbers dialed from a tele-
phone after the call is initially setup or ‘cut-through,’”139 on the basis 
that they may contain sensitive information tantamount to the con-
tents of a communication.140 A federal judge in Oregon rejected the 
Drug Enforcement Administration’s practice of requesting prescrip-
tion records held in a secure state prescription drug monitoring da-
tabase with an administrative subpoena instead of a warrant.  The 
court held that the third-party doctrine does not apply because of the 
sensitivity of the records and the lack of voluntary conveyance of 
records incident to necessary medical care.141 State supreme courts 
across the country have rejected application of the third-party doc-
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 138 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286–88 (6th Cir. 2010); see also 
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trine under their states’ constitutions as applied to sensitive infor-
mation such as dialed telephone numbers, bank records, medical 
records, employment records, and other data.142 
Yet, vast quantities of sensitive digital records are as-yet unpro-
tected by judicial precedent. Private companies now hold copies of 
individuals’ genetic profiles, potentially shedding light on familial 
relationships and genetic diseases.143 Electricity providers retain in-
creasingly granular power consumption data generated by “smart 
meters,” which can show not only when a person is home, but even 
which appliances she is using.144 Untold millions of family photos, 
sensitive documents, and private communications are stored in the 
cloud, on servers of companies offering the service for free or low 
cost.145 AT&T retains records of every phone call to transit its net-
work dating “as far back as 1987,” laying bare a generation’s worth 
of contacts and associations of a vast number of Americans.146 Re-
quests for third-party data can “allow[] the government to know 
from YouTube.com what we watch, or Facebook.com what we post 
or whom we ‘friend,’ or Amazon.com what we buy, or Wikipe-
dia.com what we research, or Match.com whom we date.”147 These 
records, of course, may be of acute interest to law enforcement in 
criminal investigations,148 making the need for protective Fourth 
Amendment rules paramount. 
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Davis and similar cases also open the door to discussion of legal 
limits on other location tracking technologies used by law enforce-
ment agencies directly, without the assistance of a third-party com-
pany. Law enforcement agencies across the country are increasingly 
bypassing cellular service providers by surreptitiously deploying 
“cell site simulators,” also known as Stingrays, to track and pre-
cisely locate cell phones.149 These devices mimic legitimate cell 
phone towers, forcing all phones within range that use the imper-
sonated cellular network to broadcast their unique electronic serial 
numbers.150 By virtue of those transmissions the devices can pre-
cisely identify phones’ locations.151 Cell site simulators raise consti-
tutional concerns because they can learn information about location 
and activities within homes and other constitutionally protected 
spaces, and can sweep in information about large numbers of by-
standers’ phones in the process of searching for a particular sus-
pect.152 Despite the widespread use of the technology,153 judicial 
consideration of the Fourth Amendment issues has been slow to ma-
terialize, largely because police have wrapped their use of cell site 
simulators in an incredible cloak of secrecy.154 Courts are beginning 
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to address the issue, which presents the issue of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections for location information without the complica-
tion of the third-party doctrine.155 
Use of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) also threatens 
to give law enforcement access to large volumes of information 
about people’s locations and movements. ALPRs, which are oper-
ated both by law enforcement and private companies, can log the 
locations of many thousands of cars as they drive the streets, feeding 
those records into massive databases that can trace a whole popula-
tion’s movements and activities over space and time.156 Inconspicu-
ous pole cameras, which can be trained on private residences and 
record weeks or months of peoples’ comings and goings raise simi-
lar concerns.157 The rapidly expanding market for drone technology 
raises the specter of police departments deploying fleets of small 
flying surveillance platforms, containing cameras, microphones, 
and even cell site simulators and other electronic surveillance gear. 
These technologies erase the practical protections against pervasive 
government monitoring that we, as a society, have long relied on. 
As Justice Alito discussed in United States v. Jones, 
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[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of 
privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but 
practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended 
period of time was difficult and costly and therefore 
rarely undertaken.158 
However, with cell site simulators, networked ALPRs, pole 
cameras, and any number of other surveillance technologies, the 
power of police to amass detailed information about the movements 
and activities of both suspects and large numbers of Americans go-
ing about their daily lives is growing. The need for courts and legis-
latures to provide strong protections for location information is 
growing ever more pressing. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal system has always been playing catch up with tech-
nology.  It is up to the judiciary to check the executive branch in its 
continuing efforts to use technology in creative and aggressive 
ways. Although the Supreme Court has embraced this role in recent 
cases involving cell phones, courts of appeals must fill the gaps 
around cell site location information, other forms of sensitive digital 
data and invasive surveillance techniques. The circuit courts should 
not follow the Eleventh Circuit in rotely invoking 1970s cases in 
ways that make no sense when applied to today’s technology. 
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